Download or read book A Belief based Theory for Private Information Games written by Marco Serena and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 29 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We propose a belief-based theory for private information games. A Bk player forms correct beliefs up to the kth-order, and heuristic beliefs from the (k +1)th-order onwards. Correct beliefs follow the prior distribution of types, as in standard game theory. Heuristic beliefs ignore the distribution of types and are rather heuristic projections of one own's type onto the rival, of the form "my rival is of my type". A Bk best responds to those partially correct and partially heuristic beliefs. As a result, a B∞ plays the standard game theoretic Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, where the player's entire hierarchy of beliefs is correct, and a B0 plays the Nash equilibrium of the symmetric-type complete information version of the game, where the entire hierarchy of beliefs is heuristic. We ground the belief-based theory on the psychological literature, we illustrate it through a simple yet novel game, we apply it to standard games and we compare its predictions with those of cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin, 2005), which is another single-parameter generalization of the standard game theoretic Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Despite the two theories are conceptually different, predictions often overlap.
Download or read book Game Theory and Business Applications written by Kalyan Chatterjee and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-06-26 with total page 407 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Game theory has been applied to a growing list of practical problems, from antitrust analysis to monetary policy; from the design of auction institutions to the structuring of incentives within firms; from patent races to dispute resolution. The purpose of Game Theory and Business Applications is to show how game theory can be used to model and analyze business decisions. The contents of this revised edition contain a wide variety of business functions – from accounting to operations, from marketing to strategy to organizational design. In addition, specific application areas include market competition, law and economics, bargaining and dispute resolution, and competitive bidding. All of these applications involve competitive decision settings, specifically situations where a number of economic agents in pursuit of their own self-interests and in accordance with the institutional “rules of the game” take actions that together affect all of their fortunes. As this volume demonstrates, game theory provides a compelling guide for analyzing business decisions and strategies.
Download or read book Epistemic Game Theory written by Andrés Perea and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2012-06-07 with total page 581 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The first textbook to explain the principles of epistemic game theory.
Download or read book A Long Run Collaboration on Long Run Games written by Drew Fudenberg and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2009 with total page 417 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.
Download or read book Game and Economic Theory written by Sergiu Hart and published by University of Michigan Press. This book was released on 1995 with total page 478 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Outstanding works showing the application of game theory to economic theory.
Download or read book Behavioral Game Theory written by Colin F. Camerer and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2011-09-05 with total page 569 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Game theory, the formalized study of strategy, began in the 1940s by asking how emotionless geniuses should play games, but ignored until recently how average people with emotions and limited foresight actually play games. This book marks the first substantial and authoritative effort to close this gap. Colin Camerer, one of the field's leading figures, uses psychological principles and hundreds of experiments to develop mathematical theories of reciprocity, limited strategizing, and learning, which help predict what real people and companies do in strategic situations. Unifying a wealth of information from ongoing studies in strategic behavior, he takes the experimental science of behavioral economics a major step forward. He does so in lucid, friendly prose. Behavioral game theory has three ingredients that come clearly into focus in this book: mathematical theories of how moral obligation and vengeance affect the way people bargain and trust each other; a theory of how limits in the brain constrain the number of steps of "I think he thinks . . ." reasoning people naturally do; and a theory of how people learn from experience to make better strategic decisions. Strategic interactions that can be explained by behavioral game theory include bargaining, games of bluffing as in sports and poker, strikes, how conventions help coordinate a joint activity, price competition and patent races, and building up reputations for trustworthiness or ruthlessness in business or life. While there are many books on standard game theory that address the way ideally rational actors operate, Behavioral Game Theory stands alone in blending experimental evidence and psychology in a mathematical theory of normal strategic behavior. It is must reading for anyone who seeks a more complete understanding of strategic thinking, from professional economists to scholars and students of economics, management studies, psychology, political science, anthropology, and biology.
Download or read book Game Theory for Cyber Deception written by Jeffrey Pawlick and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2021-01-30 with total page 192 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book introduces game theory as a means to conceptualize, model, and analyze cyber deception. Drawing upon a collection of deception research from the past 10 years, the authors develop a taxonomy of six species of defensive cyber deception. Three of these six species are highlighted in the context of emerging problems such as privacy against ubiquitous tracking in the Internet of things (IoT), dynamic honeynets for the observation of advanced persistent threats (APTs), and active defense against physical denial-of-service (PDoS) attacks. Because of its uniquely thorough treatment of cyber deception, this book will serve as a timely contribution and valuable resource in this active field. The opening chapters introduce both cybersecurity in a manner suitable for game theorists and game theory as appropriate for cybersecurity professionals. Chapter Four then guides readers through the specific field of defensive cyber deception. A key feature of the remaining chapters is the development of a signaling game model for the species of leaky deception featured in honeypots and honeyfiles. This model is expanded to study interactions between multiple agents with varying abilities to detect deception. Game Theory for Cyber Deception will appeal to advanced undergraduates, graduate students, and researchers interested in applying game theory to cybersecurity. It will also be of value to researchers and professionals working on cybersecurity who seek an introduction to game theory.
Download or read book Game Theory written by Michael Maschler and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2020-06-25 with total page 1053 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This new edition is unparalleled in breadth of coverage, thoroughness of technical explanations and number of worked examples.
Download or read book Game Theory and Behavior written by Jeffrey Carpenter and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2022-12-06 with total page 725 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An introduction to game theory that offers not only theoretical tools but also the intuition and behavioral insights to apply these tools to real-world situations. This introductory text on game theory provides students with both the theoretical tools to analyze situations through the logic of game theory and the intuition and behavioral insights to apply these tools to real-world situations. It is unique among game theory texts in offering a clear, formal introduction to standard game theory while incorporating evidence from experimental data and introducing recent behavioral models. Students will not only learn about incentives, how to represent situations as games, and what agents “should” do in these situations, but they will also be presented with evidence that either confirms the theoretical assumptions or suggests a way in which the theory might be updated. Features: Each chapter begins with a motivating example that can be run as an experiment and ends with a discussion of the behavior in the example. Parts I–IV cover the fundamental “nuts and bolts” of any introductory game theory course, including the theory of games, simple games with simultaneous decision making by players, sequential move games, and incomplete information in simultaneous and sequential move games. Parts V–VII apply the tools developed in previous sections to bargaining, cooperative game theory, market design, social dilemmas, and social choice and voting. Part VIII offers a more in-depth discussion of behavioral game theory models including evolutionary and psychological game theory. Supplemental material on the book’s website include solutions to end-of-chapter exercises, a manual for running each chapter’s experimental games using pencil and paper, and the oTree codes for running the games online.
Download or read book Game Theory written by Steven N. Durlauf and published by Springer. This book was released on 2016-07-14 with total page 391 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Specially selected from The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 2nd edition, each article within this compendium covers the fundamental themes within the discipline and is written by a leading practitioner in the field. A handy reference tool.
Download or read book Game Theory for Applied Economists written by Robert Gibbons and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 1992-07-13 with total page 284 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An introduction to one of the most powerful tools in modern economics Game Theory for Applied Economists introduces one of the most powerful tools of modern economics to a wide audience: those who will later construct or consume game-theoretic models. Robert Gibbons addresses scholars in applied fields within economics who want a serious and thorough discussion of game theory but who may have found other works too abstract. Gibbons emphasizes the economic applications of the theory at least as much as the pure theory itself; formal arguments about abstract games play a minor role. The applications illustrate the process of model building—of translating an informal description of a multi-person decision situation into a formal game-theoretic problem to be analyzed. Also, the variety of applications shows that similar issues arise in different areas of economics, and that the same game-theoretic tools can be applied in each setting. In order to emphasize the broad potential scope of the theory, conventional applications from industrial organization have been largely replaced by applications from labor, macro, and other applied fields in economics. The book covers four classes of games, and four corresponding notions of equilibrium: static games of complete information and Nash equilibrium, dynamic games of complete information and subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, static games of incomplete information and Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and dynamic games of incomplete information and perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Download or read book Epistemic Game Theory and Logic written by Paul Weirich and published by MDPI. This book was released on 2018-04-27 with total page 189 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book is a printed edition of the Special Issue "Epistemic Game Theory and Modal Logic" that was published in Games
Download or read book Decision and Game Theory for Security written by Linda Bushnell and published by Springer. This book was released on 2018-10-22 with total page 652 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The 28 revised full papers presented together with 8 short papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 44 submissions.Among the topical areas covered were: use of game theory; control theory; and mechanism design for security and privacy; decision making for cybersecurity and security requirements engineering; security and privacy for the Internet-of-Things; cyber-physical systems; cloud computing; resilient control systems, and critical infrastructure; pricing; economic incentives; security investments, and cyber insurance for dependable and secure systems; risk assessment and security risk management; security and privacy of wireless and mobile communications, including user location privacy; sociotechnological and behavioral approaches to security; deceptive technologies in cybersecurity and privacy; empirical and experimental studies with game, control, or optimization theory-based analysis for security and privacy; and adversarial machine learning and crowdsourcing, and the role of artificial intelligence in system security.
Download or read book Game Theory Evolving written by Herbert Gintis and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2000 with total page 576 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The study of strategic action (game theory) is moving from a formal science of rational behavior to an evolutionary tool kit for studying behavior in a broad array of social settings. In this problem-oriented introduction to the field, Herbert Gintis exposes students to the techniques and applications of game theory through a wealth of sophisticated and surprisingly fun-to-solve problems involving human (and even animal) behavior. Game Theory Evolving is innovative in several ways. First, it reflects game theory's expansion into such areas as cooperation in teams, networks, the evolution and diffusion of preferences, the connection between biology and economics, artificial life simulations, and experimental economics. Second, the book--recognizing that students learn by doing and that most game theory texts are weak on problems--is organized around problems, and introduces principles through practice. Finally, the quality of the problems is simply unsurpassed, and each chapter provides a study plan for instructors interested in teaching evolutionary game theory. Reflecting the growing consensus that in many important contexts outside of anonymous markets, human behavior is not well described by classical "rationality," Gintis shows students how to apply game theory to model how people behave in ways that reflect the special nature of human sociality and individuality. This book is perfect for upper undergraduate and graduate economics courses as well as a terrific introduction for ambitious do-it-yourselfers throughout the behavioral sciences.
Download or read book Essays on Political Institutions written by Alexander Victor Hirsch and published by Stanford University. This book was released on 2010 with total page 122 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This collection of essays studies the preferences of political actors over the policies that their respective political institutions enact; what those preferences consist of, how they change and are changed by their institutional environment, and how to measure them given that institutional environment. Traditionally, scholars of positive political science have assumed that 1) preferences are exogenous and fixed, and 2) policies may be ordered on a single left-right ideological continuum over which preferences are single-peaked. The first essay in this collection takes these assumptions as given. It asks whether the preferences of legislators may be properly estimated from observable votes in Congress if one of a broad class of lawmaking theories known as pivot theories describes the data generating process. In pivot theories the consent of multiple key actors known as pivots are necessary for successful policy change. Clinton (2007) argues that the behavior predicted by pivot theories is such that legislators' underlying preferences should not be recoverable from votes. The contribution of the first essay is to argue and present Monte Carlo evidence that this claim is false for a sensible modification of the theories. The broader implication of this finding is that measures of legislators' policy preferences generated from votes are valid for testing a broad class of Congressional lawmaking theories. The second and third essays in this collection both present theoretical models that push beyond the traditional assumptions on policy preferences. The second essay (co-authored with Kenneth W. Shotts) extends the basic spatial model to capture the notion of good public policy by assuming that policies, in additional to their ideological quality, may have a valence dimension that is endogenously determined by political actors. Using this model we revisit the canonical Congressional committee specialization game proposed by Gilligan and Krehbiel, and demonstrate how modeling committee specialization as the production of policy-specific valence generates results that starkly contrast with widely accepted propositions about legislative organization in the Congressional literature. The third essay departs starkly from the spatial model by assuming that political actors share identical preferences over policy outcomes, and that their differences in realized policy preferences are the consequence of openly differing beliefs about which policies will most effectively achieve shared goals. The essay develops this assumption in the context of a simple delegation game of policy choice and implementation, and shows that when additional learning about policy efficacy is possible policy disagreements driven by openly differing beliefs predict markedly distinct behavior from previously analyzed forms of conflict. In particular, when political actors share power over policy choice and implementation, they have short-term incentives to take actions that they believe will persuade each other that their beliefs are mistaken. One manifestation of this incentive can be the choice by one political actor of a policy he is certain will lead to a negative outcome, in order persuade another actor that an alternative policy is superior.
Download or read book Decision and Game Theory for Security written by Stefan Rass and published by Springer. This book was released on 2017-10-12 with total page 543 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2017, held in Vienna, Austria, in October 2017. The 24 revised full papers presented together with 4 short papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 71 submissions.The papers address topics such as Game theory and mechanism design for security and privacy; Pricing and economic incentives for building dependable and secure systems; Dynamic control, learning, and optimization and approximation techniques; Decision making and decision theory for cybersecurity and security requirements engineering; Socio-technological and behavioral approaches to security; Risk assessment and risk management; Security investment and cyber insurance; Security and privacy for the Internet-of-Things (IoT), cyber-physical systems, resilient control systems; New approaches for security and privacy in cloud computing and for critical infrastructure; Security and privacy of wireless and mobile communications, including user location privacy; Game theory for intrusion detection; and Empirical and experimental studies with game-theoretic or optimization analysis for security and privacy.
Download or read book The Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis written by Sanjit S. Dhami and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2016 with total page 1799 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: It considers the evidence against the exponential discounted utility model and describes several behavioral models such as hyperbolic discounting, attribute based models and the reference time theory. Part IV describes the evidence on classical game theory and considers several models of behavioral game theory, including level-k and cognitive hierarchy models, quantal response equilibrium, and psychological game theory. Part V considers behavioral models of learning that include evolutionary game theory, classical models of learning, experience weighted attraction model, learning direction theory, and stochastic social dynamics. Part VI studies the role of emotions; among other topics it considers projection bias, temptation preferences, happiness economics, and interaction between emotions and cognition. Part VII considers bounded rationality. The three main topics considered are judgment heuristics and biases, mental accounting, and behavioral finance.
